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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the influence of the legal environment on the post-takeover 
value of a firm. The idea behind this thesis stems from the large number of discussions 
concerning the future of the European corporate governance system and the direction its 
development is taking. In this thesis the following issues were formalized and analyzed: 
the existing differences between the two major corporate governance systems of the U.S. 
and the European Union (EU); and secondly constructed a formal model to demonstrate 
the influence of legal parameters on the post-takeover value of a firm. I construct a new 
model based on the one introduced by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2005). This model 
formalizes, in the author’s opinion, three key differences between the two major systems 
of corporate governance: the possibility of implementing defensive strategies, the effect 
of the size of the toehold and the influence of majority blockholders. 
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Introduction 
 
Since 1980 the number of mergers and takeovers has easily exceeded 10000 deals per 
annum. The money involved in this business is very big. According to the latest valuation 
of the market for corporate control, the total sum of all takeover transactions exceeds $1 
trillion globally. Never in modern history has this large a number ever been seen. And 
taking into account the influence that this brings to the development of economies, it is - 
in general - not possible to ignore the importance of the systems of corporate governance 
which regulate mergers and takeovers. 
 
Takeovers constitute a great part of modern economic reality, and in recent times they 
have become one of the most significant indicators of economic health. Takeovers allow 
the removal of managers who are not acting in the shareholders’ best interest. As such, 
they are considered an important check on managers of large public corporations; the 
mere threat of a takeover disciplines managers. However, the study of the theoretical 
foundations of takeovers and their effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism has been 
questioned on a variety of different grounds, such as agency problems within the 
acquiring firm or expropriation of the target firm’s stakeholders. Grossman and Hart 
(1980) and Bradley (1980) show that despite the threat of a takeover, managers who 
pursue self-serving actions, in the situation where ownership is widely dispersed, need 
not be vulnerable to the disciplinary threat of a takeover. Being too small to affect the 
outcome, each shareholder tenders only if the bid price at least matches the post-takeover 
share value. The only way for the acquirer to succeed in the face of this free-rider 
problem is to offer a price so high that he does not earn a profit. Consequently, he has no 
incentive to launch a bid, and inefficient managers face no risk of being ousted. 
 
Essentially therefore, the outcome and possible success of any takeover attempt is 
dependent upon the legal environment regulating any takeover bid. Given that the legal 
environment is determined by the corporate governance system in place, there are several 
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academic works and many ongoing discussions as to what constitutes the better system of 
corporate governance. 
 
There are two polar systems of corporate governance: the market-based system and the 
blockholder-based system. The former system prevails in the United Kingdom (U.K.), the 
United States (U.S.) and the Commonwealth countries, whilst Continental Europe is 
largely governed by the latter. Essentially the two systems differ not only in terms of the 
rationale behind their legal rules, but also in terms of their ownership and control. 
Regarding legality, the market-based system relies on legal rules largely resulting from 
case law and on the effective legal enforcement of shareholder rights. Conversely the 
blockholder-based system of Continental Europe relies on codified law and emphasizes 
rules protecting stakeholders such as creditors and employees. Regarding ownership and 
control, most Continental European companies are characterized by majority or near-
majority stakes held by one or few investors; whilst in contrast, the Anglo-American 
system is characterized by dispersed equity. In recent times the increase in economic 
globalization as well the move in Europe to decrease the influence of state boundaries has 
fuelled the debate as to what constitutes the better system of corporate governance 
(McCahery (2002)). 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the influence of the legal environment on the post-takeover 
value of a firm. The idea behind this thesis stems from the large number of discussions 
concerning the future of the European corporate governance system and the direction its 
development is taking. Whether it is going to be like the U.S. system or the German 
corporate governance system or will it be something new; a hybrid. Regarding the 
structure of this thesis, the idea was to first formalize and analyze the existing differences 
between the two major corporate governance systems of the U.S. and the European 
Union (EU); and secondly to construct a formal model to demonstrate the influence of 
legal parameters on the post-takeover value of a firm. 
 
I construct a new model based on the one introduced by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(2005). This model formalizes, in the author’s opinion, three key differences between the 
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two major systems of corporate governance: the possibility of implementing defensive 
strategies, the effect of the size of the toehold and the influence of majority blockholders. 
 
In part 1 of this thesis, I review the necessary theoretical background. In addressing the 
importance of takeovers (Section 1.1) I look at the situation of the market for corporate 
control. Further examination of the development of the theories concerning takeovers was 
necessary within this section in order to complete my analysis. In Section 1.2 I review 
both the pioneering theory of Grossman and Hart (1980) and the issue of ex-post 
efficiency in general. Section 1.3 then looks at ex-ante efficiency, concentrating mainly 
upon the disciplinary role of takeovers. I then briefly review the theoretical issues 
regarding optimal takeovers and how these issues might be resolved. Section 1.4 
discusses blockholders and their effect on the outcome of a takeover; whilst the 
importance of toehold strategies is discussed in Section 1.5. After looking at these 
different theories, I conclude by reviewing the institutional differences between the U.S. 
and the EU.  
 
Section 2.1 analyzes the general differences in the corporate governance systems of the 
U.S. and the EU. The more distinctive features of ownership structures are discussed in 
Section 2.1.1. Further analysis dealing with capital structure and capital requirements that 
are used in the U.S. and Europe, is done within Section 2.1.2. In Section 2.1.3 I talk about 
the different roles of financial institutions within these two systems. Section 2.1.4 deals 
with the question of incorporation; a table is presented demonstrating the major 
differences. The discussion of takeover barriers and defensive strategies is held in Section 
2.1.5. In Section 2.2, I then concentrate on reviewing the diversity of the European Union 
member state’s laws in an attempt to look at the degree of harmonization in the united 
Europe and to single out the commonalities between countries. 
 
In the next part, Section 3, I concentrate on analyzing two models. In Section 3.1 the 
Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi model is analyzed. Presented are the main features and 
results of this model. I then introduce three new parameters to this model in Section 3.2. 
These are the probability of the implementation of a defensive strategy and the benefits of 
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such an implementation (3.2.1), the effect of the presence of a large shareholder (3.2.2) 
and the possibility of the use of toehold strategies (buying shares on the open market) 
(3.2.3). Included in each section is an analysis of the effect that each parameter has on the 
model, thus showing the consequences of these regulatory tools. The last Section, 3.3, 
analyzes the full model, including all the parameters. Basically the author argues that in 
the case of a minority blockholder - his presence as well as the possibility shareholders 
have to implement defensive strategies - increases the post-takeover value of a firm, 
whilst simultaneously decreasing the probability of a takeover. However, toeholds give 
rivals more incentives to bid. Conversely in the case of a majority blockholder everything 
is dependent upon his valuation of his shares. Of course, defensive strategies increase his 
value but toeholds play no role here. And takeover probability is the lowest in this case. 
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Section 1: Theory
Section 1.1: Takeovers 
Economic analysis and evidence indicate that the market for corporate control is 
ultimately benefiting shareholders, society and the corporate form of organization. But 
the takeover wave in the U.S. in the 1980s and in Europe in the 1990s, together with the 
recent merger wave, has simultaneously fuelled public debate on corporate governance. 
In Continental Europe, the sleepy corporate world has been spectacularly shaken by the 
fact that a significant proportion of these deals have largely involved newly privatized 
giants and by the apparent lack of opposition to these mergers and takeovers by the social 
democratic administrations in place at the time. One remarkable example of these recent 
takeover deals is the successful $199 billion cross-border hostile bid of Vodafone for 
Mannesmann in 2000; the largest ever to take place in Europe1. Understandably, these 
high profile cases have moved takeover regulation of domestic and cross-border deals in 
the European Union to the top of the political agenda. 
 
According to an FTI Capital Advisors, LLC. report in 2005, the value of announced 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) transactions globally exceeded $1 trillion for the first 
time since 20002. 
Figure 1: Aggregate Number and Value of Deals(FTI Capital Advisors, LLC.( 2005)) 
 
                                                 
1 The other notable examples are the recent hostile takeovers in Italy: Olivetti for Telecom Italia; Generali 
for INA and in France: BNP-Paribas; Elf Aquitaine for Total Fina.
2 In addition, the 10,369 announced transactions was the highest ever annual total, just eclipsing the prior 
record set in 2004. The market continues to be driven by accommodating debt markets, low interest rates 
and competition among cash rich strategic and financial buyers pursuing transactions at all size levels. 
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Further driving the increase in deal value is the ongoing strength in M&A activity at the 
$1 billion-plus level3. This became a trend not only for the highly valued corporation’s 
market, but also for the middle market4, as was especially seen in 20055. Activity also 
increased for even smaller transactions6. 
Figure 2: Number and Value of M&A Deals by Size (FTI Capital Advisors, LLC. (2005)) 
 
 
The number of transactions, however, varies by economic sector7. Understandably, this is 
driven by both the economics situations and the legal environments in different parts of 
the world. The process of globalization touches even the corporate government system. 
                                                 
3 Top transactions in this category included Procter & Gamble’s $57.9 billion acquisition of Gillette, 
ConocoPhillips’ $34.8 billion acquisition of Burlington Resources, and Bank of America’s $34.4 billion 
acquisition of MBNA. 
4 Defined as transactions of $25-$250 million in value. 
5 These two markets are growing with the number and value of transactions increasing 7% and 6% 
respectively over the previous year. 
6 Defined as transactions of $10-25 million in value. Number and value of transactions are growing 13% 
and 14%, respectively over the previous year. 
7 In terms of number of transactions, sectors leading the surge in M&A in 2005 included computer 
software, supplies & services, and miscellaneous services. Top deals in the computer sector included 
Oracle/Siebel Systems ($5.6 billion), Adobe Systems/Macromedia ($3.6 billion), InterActiveCorp/Ask 
Jeeves ($1.9 billion) and the $10.4 billion tender offer for SunGard Data Systems led by a consortium of 
private equity groups including Silver Lake Partners, Bain Capital, Blackstone Group and KKR. In the 
services sector, notable transactions included the $22 billion buyout of Hertz Corp. by Carlyle Group, 
Clayton Dubilier & Rice and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, and the $1.1 billion buyout of 
DoubleClick by Hellman & Friedman. In terms of aggregate transaction value, the banking & finance and 
oil & gas sectors were the most active. 
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Taking into consideration the importance of the market of corporate control it is 
impossible not to notice the influence of takeovers on the financial sector, social sector 
and the development of corporate governance. 
 
All these facts highlight two important questions –How does the legal framework 
influence the takeover process? And what sort of consequences does the legal framework 
have for the value of transactions and therefore for shareholders? 
 
In order to facilitate an approach to these questions the author has decided to give the 
reader some insight to the development of the theory behind mergers and takeovers. 
 
Takeovers are used as a radical mechanism for replacing and sometimes disciplining 
managers. The principle of a hostile (unfriendly/unwanted) takeover is quite simple: the 
raider makes an offer to buy all or a fraction of outstanding shares at a stated tender price. 
The takeover is successful if the raider gains more than 50% of the voting shares and 
thereby obtains effective control of the company. With more than 50% of the voting 
shares, in due course he will be able to gain majority representation on the board and thus 
be able to appoint the CEO. However, the mechanism of a takeover is highly disruptive 
and costly. Even in the biggest economy in the world, the U.S., hostile takeovers are 
rarely used as a mechanism to substitute management. In most other countries they are 
almost nonexistent. 
 
Despite their rarity, hostile takeovers have received a great deal of attention from 
academic researchers. Much research has been devoted to the mechanics of the takeover 
process, the analysis of potentially complex strategies for the raider and individual 
shareholders, and to the question of ex-post efficiency8 of the outcome. Much less 
research has been concerned with the ex-ante efficiency of hostile takeovers and effect of 
blockholders as minority and majority shareholders. And even less research has dealt 
with the impact of different regulatory tools on the outcome of takeovers. In the 
 
8 With respect to hostile takeovers the term ex-post efficiency refers to the analysis of the outcome of a 
takeover, once the takeover has actually occurred. 
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following sections I will give some insight to the reader about a variety of these takeover 
issues that have previously been given attention. 
Section 1.2: Ex-post efficiency 
One can find a large amount of literature devoted to the issue of ex-post efficiency of 
hostile takeovers. The classical formal model of a tender offer game is attributed to 
Grossman and Hart (1980). They consider the following basic game. A raider can raise 
the value per share from v = 0 under current management to v = 1. He needs 50% of the 
voting shares and makes a conditional tender offer of p per share9. Share ownership is 
completely dispersed amongst an infinite number of shareholders. The result is almost 
obvious - a dominant strategy for each shareholder is to tender if p ≥ 1 and to hold on to 
their shares if p < 1. Therefore the lowest price at which the raider is able to take over the 
firm is p = 1, the post-takeover value per share. Simply, the raider has to give up all the 
value he can generate to existing shareholders. If he incurs costs in making the offer or in 
undertaking the management changes that produce the higher value per share he may 
well be discouraged from attempting a takeover. In other words, there may be too few 
takeover attempts ex-post. 
 
Several ways were suggested by Grossman and Hart (1980) to improve the efficiency of 
the hostile takeover mechanism. All involve some dilution of minority shareholder rights. 
Consistent with their proposals, for example, is the idea that raiders be allowed to 
“squeeze (freeze) out”10 minority shareholders that have not tendered their shares, or to 
allow raiders to build up a larger “toehold”11 before they are required to disclose their 
stake. 
 
 
9 See Appendix 1 
10 A squeeze or freeze out forces minority shareholders to sell their shares to the raider at (or below) the 
tender offer price. When the raider has this right it is no longer a dominant strategy to hold on to one’s 
shares when p < 1. 
11 A toehold is the stake owned by the raider before he makes a tender offer. In the U.S. a shareholder 
owning more than 5% of the outstanding shares of a firm must disclose his stake to the SEC. The raider can 
always make a profit on his toehold by taking over the firm. Thus the larger his toehold the more likely he 
is to make a takeover attempt. See Shleifer and Vishny (1986). 
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A large amount of literature has followed the publication of the Grossman and Hart 
article attempting to develop different variants of the takeover game; with non-atomistic 
share ownership (Holmström and Nalebuff (1990)), with multiple bidders (Burkart 
(1995), Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999)), with multiple rounds of bidding 
(Dewatripont, (1993)), with arbitrageurs and asymmetric information (Hirshleifer and 
Titman (1990)). Many of the results found Grossman and Hart’s conclusion, that most of 
the gains of a takeover go to target shareholders (because of “freeriding” by small 
shareholders), to be non-robust when there is only one bidder. Grossman and Hart’s 
extreme “freeriding” result breaks down with either non-atomistic shareholders or 
asymmetric information. Empirical studies have repeatedly found that all the gains from 
hostile takeovers go, on average, to target shareholders (Jensen and Ruback (1983), and 
Burkart and Panunzi (2000)). 
 
At this point it is worth noting that economists differ upon two closely related criteria. 
The first is ex-post efficiency (as discussed above) and the second is ex-ante efficiency12. 
Section 1.3: Ex-ante efficiency 
Scharfstein (1988) gives a formal analysis of the issue of ex-ante efficiency. His work is 
based on the classical insights of Grossman and Hart (1980). Scharfstein considers the 
ex-ante financial contracting problem between a financier and a manager. He presents a 
theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial 
incentive problems stemming from asymmetric information. Scharfstein argues that an 
informed raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation more 
sensitive to the information available to shareholders. In this sort of contract 
compensation scheme, the manager is induced to make an optimal effort provision. But it 
must be said that this contract also allows for ex-post takeovers, which can be efficiency 
enhancing if the raider either has information about the state of nature not available to the 
financier or if the raider is a better manager. Thus takeovers can be seen to be useful both 
because they reduce the informational monopoly of the incumbent manager about the 
 
12 In the context of takeovers ex-ante efficiency is defined as the analysis of the outcome of takeover prior 
to the actual takeover occurrence. Thus they allow us to understand the extent to which takeovers are an 
effective disciplining device on managers. 
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state of the firm and because they allow for the replacement of inefficient managers. 
Scharfstein also made another important observation: even if the firm can commit to an 
ex-ante optimal contract, this contract is generally inefficient. This is basically because 
the financier and manager partly design the contract to extract the efficiency rents of 
future raiders. As a result the “price” of the acquisition will be set above the efficient 
competitive price, and as a consequence, the contract will induce too few hostile 
takeovers on average.  
 
Scharfstein’s observations provide an important justification for regulatory intervention 
limiting anti-takeover defenses, such as super-majority amendments13, staggered boards14 
, fair price amendments15, and poison pills16. These defenses can be seen to be against 
shareholders’ interests and to be implemented by managers of companies with weak 
corporate governance structures (Gilson (1981)). However, these defensive mechanisms 
can also be seen to be an important weapon, making it possible for the target firm to 
extract better terms from a raider (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman 
(1990), and Hirshleifer (1995)). But the crux of Scharfstein’s argument suggests that 
some of these defenses should be regulated or banned. 
Section 1.3: Optimal takeover issues 
The question of rational regulation has been and continuous to be very important. Both 
scholars and government regulators have focused their attention on this question. In 
academic literature there are usually four issues that are discussed in a formal analysis of 
optimal takeovers: 1) whether deviations from a “one-share-one vote” rule result in 
inefficient takeover outcomes; 2) whether raiders should be required to buy out minority 
shareholders; 3) whether takeovers may result in the partial expropriation of other 
inadequately protected claims on the corporation, and if so, whether some anti-takeover 
amendments may be justified as basic protections against expropriation; and 4) whether 
proxy contests should be favored over tender offers. 
 
13 See Appendix 1 
14 See Appendix 1 
15 See Appendix 1 
16 See Appendix 1 
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Many different approaches have been made to investigate the efficiency of the one-share-
one-vote rule. One such experiment was held by the New York Stock Exchange from 
1926 to 1986. It was required that every new listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
issue a single class of voting stock17. Companies could only issue shares with the same 
number (effectively one) of votes each. As suggested in the analysis of Grossman and 
Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988), this kind of regulation induces efficient 
corporate control contest. Under the one-share-one-vote rule rivals must pay the highest 
possible price to acquire control over the firm, this is even more important when the 
raider is inefficient. In other words, under this rule raiders face the greatest deterrent to 
taking over a firm. In addition, a simple majority rule is more likely to achieve efficiency 
by treating the incumbent management and the raider symmetrically. 
 
However, initial shareholders may extract a greater share of the efficiency gain of the 
raider in a value-increasing takeover by deviating from the one-share-one-vote rule. 
Maximum extraction of the raider’s efficiency rent can be obtained by issuing two 
extreme classes of shares, votes-only shares and non-voting shares (Harris and Raviv 
(1988), and Gromb (1997)). In this share ownership structure only shares with votes will 
be purchased by the raider. Thus, whilst a rival can gain control much more easily, all the 
benefits he brings goes to both the voting and non-voting shareholders. Therefore, when 
there is a two class share allocating scheme in use all non-voting shareholders have no 
choice but to free-ride and appropriate most of the gains from the takeover. 
 
Family-owned firms are often reluctant to go public if in the process they risk losing 
control. Given that loss of control is likely in the situation of the one-share-one-vote rule, 
these firms generally benefit from any deviation from this rule. Retention of control is 
more likely through a dual-class share structure. Indeed, any deviation from one-share-
one-vote rule to this structure would benefit both the company and the exchange (Hart 
(1988)); ultimately increasing the likelihood of family owned firms to go public. Burkart, 
 
17 The Ford Motor Company was the only exception from the listing rule. It was listed with a dual class 
stock capitalization in 1956, allowing the Ford family to exert 40% of the voting rights with 5.1% of the 
capital. See Seligman (1986). 
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Gromb and Panunzi (1998) extend the analysis of dual-class shares by introducing a post-
takeover agency problem. Such a problem arises when the raider does not own 100% of 
the shares ex-post, and is potentially worsened when the raider’s post-takeover stake is 
close to 50%. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi show that in such a model initial shareholders 
extract the raider’s whole efficiency rent under a “one-share-one-vote” rule. As a result, 
some costly takeovers may be deterred. 
 
Regarding optimal takeover issues another mechanism exists, similar to other deviations 
from the one-share-one-vote rule, concerning whether raiders should be required to buy 
out minority shareholders. This mechanism is termed mandatory bid rules. Such a rule 
maximizes the price an inefficient raider must pay to acquire control. Maximization of 
the price is made by inducing a raider to buy all outstanding shares. As pointed out by 
Bergstrom, Hogfeldt and Molin (1997), one possible consequence of mandatory bid rules 
might be a decrease in the number of value increasing takeovers. 
 
The third mentioned issue is whether anti-takeover amendments can be justified as a 
protection against expropriation. This issue formed a fundamental part of the research 
carried out by Shleifer and Summers (1988). The result obtained in their work states that 
some takeovers may be undesirable if they result in a “breach of trust” between 
management and employees. This is a widespread situation, especially in Europe where 
the majority of companies are owned by large shareholders possessing stakes greater than 
50%. Therefore these large shareholders can control all the processes in the firm, and 
appoint loyal managers. If employees anticipate that informal relations with the current 
management may be broken by a new managerial team, they may be reluctant to invest in 
such relations and to acquire firm specific human capital. Therefore the argument is that 
anti-takeover protections may be justified at least for firms where specific (human and 
physical) capital is important. For example, Schnitzer (1995) shows that only a specific 
combination of a poison pill with a golden parachute18 would provide adequate 
protection for the manager’s (or employees’) specific investments. However, the main 
 
18 See Appendix 1 
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difficulty from a regulatory perspective is that protection of specific human capital is not 
a justifiable excuse for managerial entrenchment19. 
 
The last issue mentioned above is whether proxy fights should be favored over tender 
offers. Bebchuk and Hart (2001) propose that poison pills make it impossible to remove 
an incumbent manager through a hostile takeover unless the tender offer is accompanied 
by a proxy fight20, 21 over the redemption of the poison pill. In other words, Bebchuk and 
Hart (2001) argue that the presence of a poison pill requires a mechanism for removing 
incumbent managers that combines both a tender offer and a proxy contest. In their 
model such a mechanism dominates both straight proxy contests and straight tender 
offers. The results hold for several reasons. First, a straight proxy contest is dominated by 
a mixed strategy because shareholders tend to be (rationally) skeptical of challengers, 
given that challengers may be worse than incumbents and only seek control to gain 
access to large private benefits of control. Second, a straight tender offer is dominated 
because a tender offer puts the decision in the hands of the marginal shareholder while 
majority voting effectively puts control of the decision in the hands of the average 
shareholder. Whilst the average shareholder always votes in favor of a value increasing 
control change, in a tender offer the marginal shareholder only decides to tender if he is 
better off tendering than holding on to her shares assuming that the takeover will succeed. 
Such behavior can result in excessive freeriding and inefficient control allocations. 
Hence, by applying the mechanism proposed by Bebchuk and Hart (2001) - whereby a 
tender offer and proxy contest should be combined as opposed to favoring one over the 
other - the free-rider problem is lessened. 
 
19 See Appendix 1 
20 See Appendix 1 
21 One memorable recent example of a proxy vote took place within Hewlett-Packard, when the 
management of that company sought to takeover Compaq. Opponents of the Compaq takeover lost the 
fight. The management, under Carly Fiorina (the former CEO of HP), remained in place, and the merger 
went ahead. Hewlett-Packard spent over $100m. to convince shareholders to approve its merger with 
Compaq. In this case, it was alleged that the prospect of future corporate finance business was implicitly 
used to entice Deutsche Bank to vote for the merger. 
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Section 1.4: Large shareholders 
Another issues requiring regulation and another approach to solving the free-rider 
problem is the concept of concentrated ownership structure. This structure should include 
at least one big shareholder, who has an interest in monitoring management and has the 
power to implement management changes. These sorts of ownership structures are less 
common in the U.S. and U.K., because of regulatory restrictions on blockholder actions, 
but are in use much more in Continental Europe and other economically developed 
countries, in particular Germany and the Scandinavian countries. 
 
In the influential work of Grossman and Hart (1980) and the work of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), the first formal analyses of corporate governance with large shareholders was 
made. The authors focus their analyses on investigating the benefits of large shareholders 
in facilitating takeovers. The tradeoff between optimal risk diversification, which is 
obtained under a fully dispersed ownership structure, and optimal monitoring incentives, 
which require concentrated ownership, is the standard agency problem with moral 
hazard, which is a closely related theme. For example, it may be in the interest of a risk-
averse entrepreneur who wants to go public to retain a large stake in the firm as a signal 
of quality, or as a commitment to manage the firm well. As shown by Admati, Pfleiderer 
and Zechner (1994), in equilibrium the large shareholder has too small a stake and under-
invests in monitoring, because the large shareholder prefers to diversify his holdings 
somewhat even if this reduces his incentives to monitor. In the same research another 
result was obtained: ownership structures with one large block may be unstable if the 
blockholder can gradually erode his stake by selling small quantities of shares in the 
secondary market. This result was formally validated by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(2005). Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) advise a solution for the main problem of 
these models, namely how to give more incentives to monitor to the blockholder. The 
solution involves the possibility of subsidizing of blockholders. They argue that this 
might improve the corporate governance. 
 
Another aspect of the problem of giving the right incentives to the blockholder to monitor 
the firm is closely related to the liquidity of secondary markets. Hirschman (1970), in his 
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work, argues that blockholders cannot be relied upon to monitor management actively if 
they have the option to sell their stake instead. The idea is that blockholders would rather 
sell their stake in mismanaged firms than try to fix the management problem. This is 
known as the “Wall Street rule” (Black (1990)). As it has been argued by Mayer (1988), 
Coffee (1991), Roe (1994) and Bhide (1993), it is precisely the highly liquid nature of 
U.S. secondary markets that makes it difficult to provide incentives to large shareholders 
to monitor management. 
 
Kahn and Winton (1998) further show how market liquidity can undermine large 
shareholders’ incentives to monitor by giving them incentives to trade on private 
information rather than intervene. It was shown that for blue-chip companies, where the 
large shareholder is unlikely to have a significant informational advantage over other 
agents, incentives to speculate may be small. Maug (1998) obtained a very similar result. 
He also points out that in liquid markets it is easier to build a block. This gives large 
shareholders an added incentive to invest in information gathering. 
 
However, there is an opposite perspective. A large investor may want to limit his stake to 
ensure minimum secondary market liquidity. This perspective was widely discussed in 
the works of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). The commentators show that share prices in 
the secondary market provide valuable information about the firm’s performance. 
However, the secondary market must be sufficiently liquid to make it possible to obtain 
the correct information. Speculators’ return on acquiring information is also raised by 
liquidity. Furthermore, the informativeness of the secondary market price is also 
improved by liquidity and by an increase in the speculators’ return. To provide managers 
with more incentives, the more informative stock price can be included in the 
compensation package. In the Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) model the large shareholder 
is only there by default, because in selling to the secondary market he has to accept a 
discount reflecting the information-related trading costs that investors anticipate 
incurring. Thus, the large shareholder can achieve the desired amount of information 
acquisition in the market by adjusting the size of his stake. 
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Just as with takeovers, there are obvious benefits from large shareholder monitoring but 
there may also be costs. Takeovers might be undesirable if their main purpose is to 
expropriate employees or minority shareholders. Similarly, large shareholder monitoring 
can be too much of a good thing. If the large shareholder uses his power to hold up 
employees or managers, the latter may be discouraged from making costly firm specific 
investments. This point has been emphasized in a number of theoretical studies, most 
notably in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998). In order to 
prevent over-monitoring and ex-post opportunism a large shareholder’s stake has to be 
limited in one way or another. Over-monitoring is often evident within private firms 
where concentrated ownership structures are often the norm. However, the majority of 
the theoretical literature on large shareholders tends to only consider ownership structures 
where all shareholders but one are small. However, Zwiebel (1995) considers ownership 
structures where there may be more than one large shareholder and also allows for 
alliances among small blockholders. In such a setting he shows that one of the roles of a 
large block holding is to fend off alliances of smaller blockholders that might compete for 
control. 
 
The analyses of Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998), 
however, suggest that if there is a risk of over-monitoring or self-dealing it is often 
possible to design the corporate ownership structure or charter to limit the power of the 
blockholder. Bebchuk (1999) retorts that although it is theoretically possible to design 
corporate charters that restrain self-dealing, in reality regulations limiting blockholder 
rights are called for. He develops a model where dispersed ownership is unstable when 
large shareholders can obtain rents through self-dealing since there is always an incentive 
to grab and protect control rents. If a large shareholder does not grab the control rents 
then management will. However, Bebchuk’s extreme conclusion is based on the 
assumption that a self-dealing manager cannot be disciplined by a takeover threat, as well 
as on the assumption that dispersed ownership management may not be able to commit to 
an ex-ante efficient corporate governance rule. The issue of competition for control rents 
between a large shareholder and a manager is further analyzed in Burkart and Panunzi 
(2000). They argue that access to control rents has positive incentive effects on the 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
21
 
manager. It also has positive effects on the blockholder’s incentive to monitor. However, 
competition for these rents between the manager and the blockholder may undermine the 
incentives of either party. 
 
An important concern of many scholars is the conflict of interest among shareholders 
innate in blockholder ownership structures. This conflict is worsened when there is 
separation between voting rights and cash-flow rights, as is common in Continental 
Europe. Many have argued that such an arrangement is particularly vulnerable to self-
dealing by the controlling shareholder (Zingales (1994), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(1998), La Porta (1998), and Bebchuk (1999)). Another issue in the principle-agent 
problem that involves large shareholders is collusion between management and the 
blockholder. This aspect of the problem has not received much attention (Tirole (1986), 
Burkart and Panunzi (2000) and Dessi (2005)). However, scholars that have analyzed this 
issue argue that existing blockholder structures in Continental Europe are in fact likely to 
be inefficient and that U.S.-style regulations restricting blockholder rights should be 
phased in. 
 
Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) argue that one potential benefit of blockholder structures 
is that monitoring will take place on an ongoing basis; whilst the opposite system, with 
dispersed shareholders, can provide monitoring and intervention only in crisis situations, 
through a takeover. On the other hand, the benefit of dispersed ownership is the enhanced 
liquidity it provides within secondary markets. Obviously the legal environment plays a 
big role in choosing the best system of corporate governance to implement. If regulations 
substantially increase the costs of holding blocks then a system with dispersed 
shareholders relying on hostile takeovers may be best (Black (1990)). For example, one 
of the most striking restrictions on takeovers is the rule in the U.S. that regulates 
shareholder proposals (Rule 14a-8): a shareholder “can offer only one proposal per year, 
… must submit the proposal … 5 months before the next annual meeting …. A proposal 
cannot relate to ordinary business operations or the election of directors … and not 
conflict with a manager proposal” (Black, 1990, p. 541)) (a similar rule is in place in the 
U.K.). However, if regulations are in place that mainly increase the costs of hostile 
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takeovers but do not restrict blockholder rights (as in Continental Europe), then a system 
based on blockholder monitoring may be used more successfully. 
 
Another comparative analysis is proposed by John and Kedia (2000). They draw the 
distinction between ‘self-binding’ mechanisms (like bank or large shareholder 
monitoring) and ‘intervention’ mechanisms (like hostile takeovers). They let underlying 
conditions vary according to two parameters: the costs of bank monitoring and the 
effectiveness of hostile takeovers. Depending on the values of these parameters the 
optimal governance mechanism is either: i) concentrated ownership (when bank 
monitoring is costly and takeovers are not a threat), ii) bank monitoring (when 
monitoring costs are low and takeovers are ineffective), or iii) dispersed ownership and 
hostile takeovers (when anti-takeover defenses are low and monitoring is costly). One 
implication of their analysis is that corporate governance in Europe and Japan may not 
converge to U.S. practice simply by introducing the same takeover regulations. If banks 
are able to maintain a comparative advantage in monitoring these countries may continue 
to see a predominance of bank monitoring. 
Section 1.5: Toeholds 
A great deal of recent theoretical research has focused upon the motivations and 
consequences of mergers (Jensen (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1988)). Several papers 
have discussed bidding strategies and techniques; notable examples include Fishman 
(1988) and Hirshleifer and Png (1989) who examine optimal strategies once a tender 
offer has been declared. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the strategies 
a potential bidder may use prior to announcing a tender offer. A commonly used method 
is the open market purchase of shares (toeholds) by a potential bidder before the official 
announcement of an offer. 
 
A tender offer goes through several phases, each of which is subject to different legal 
structures. The initial phase is an acquisition period during which the bidding firm can 
employ open market purchases to obtain a toehold in the target. Legally, a firm may 
acquire up to five percent in the U.S. and up to ten percent in Europe of another firm 
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before it triggers a reporting requirement. Legal acts stipulate that once a firm obtains 
five percent of another firm's stock, it has 10 days (depending on the country) to file a 
disclosure form describing its intentions. Importantly, during this ten day period the 
potential bidder can continue to make open market purchases. Hence, toehold purchases 
may be considerably larger than 5% (10%) of a target firm. Once the report is filed, no 
additional open market activities are permitted. 
 
Following the lodgment of the report the bidder must then make an official 
announcement of the tender offer. In this announcement he has to give the price and the 
closing date of the tender and some condition of the offer. 
 
Regarding toehold strategies, the Ravid and Spiegel (1999) analysis leads to several 
conclusions. First, they demonstrate that larger toeholds are not unambiguously more 
effective at discouraging rival bidders. This may explain why many toeholds are small. 
Secondly, it was demonstrated that whilst toeholds allow the initial bidder to profit 
should a rival appear, winning is still always better than losing. However, because the 
legal institutions are part of the model within the Ravid and Spiegel analysis, it is 
possible to explore the impact of any changes within the prevailing laws. An explicit 
analysis of "fair price" provisions (which require the purchase of un-tendered shares at 
the highest price paid for any shares) indicates that such laws may provide some welfare 
benefits. In that sense, the analysis is similar in spirit to Bebchuk (1994), who concludes 
that the U.S. legal system (without the "fair price" provision) may facilitate inefficient 
transfers, whereas the Equal Opportunity rule (similar to the Fair Price provision) does 
not enable inefficient transfers to go through. 
 
There have been a number of other toehold studies that examine several other important 
issues. Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994) model the toehold selection problem as the 
solution to a signaling game regarding the bidder’s valuation of the target. Burkart's 
(1995) model provides an analysis of strategic bidding given that bidders hold initial 
stakes in the firm. His model predicts that overbidding will occur once a toehold is 
purchased. However, there is no derivation of an optimal toehold acquisition. Kyle and 
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Vila (1991) suggest that a bidder will generally want to purchase a toehold in order to 
acquire shares in the open market at a lower cost than what they can be obtained at in a 
subsequent tender offer. However, their paper does not consider multiple bidder contests 
nor does it explain why many firms never bother to purchase toehold shares. Most other 
papers, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) take the 
bidder's initial stake as given and then analyze the resulting game. Similarly, Singh 
(1995) discusses strategies for blockholders who have already purchased a toehold and 
the impact of such a situation on takeovers. Dewatripont (1993) discusses some of the 
trade-offs that are considered within a different framework, which envisions a contest 
between an initial raider and a potential white knight, with different private benefits. 
 
As it has been pointed out in many academic papers, the implementation of one strategy, 
regulation or structure is highly dependent on the legal environment. Differences in legal 
institutes in different parts of the world define the main distinctions in corporate 
governance. There are two main and often compared systems of corporate governance, 
namely the U.S. and the EU. To proceed further it is worth looking at the major 
differences between these two systems. 
 
Section 2:Institutional differences 
Section 2.1: Comparative corporate governance: The USA and 
The EU 
Corporate ownership and governance differ among the world’s economies, especially 
between the United States and the European Union. In contrast to the market-centered 
American model, European work on corporate and economic governance has generally 
reflected the dispersed allocation of political and economic power. 
 
Enormous institutional differences also exist between the U.S., which is a system of 
federal states subordinate to a national authority and bound by a common history, culture 
and language and the EU, a system of independent states, attempting to create a set of 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
25
 
                                                
common regulatory policies. During the past half-century, since World War II, 
economies and business practices have converged in the EU and even more so in the 
U.S., whilst corporate governance structures have largely remained different on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
 
Similarly to the United States, Anglo-Saxon countries like the United Kingdom have 
equity-based systems of corporate finance, where the shareholder is the center of 
regulatory and legal protections. Conversely many Continental European countries have a 
creditor-based system of corporate finance whilst some also have a long tradition of 
worker co-determination22. 
 
Although as mentioned above, there are several common features in the Anglo-American 
system of corporate governance, it is important to note that control by shareholders in the 
United Kingdom and the United States differs significantly. In the U.S. corporations 
enjoy extensive protection through anti-takeover laws, which is not the case in the U.K. 
Additionally, directors in the U.S. are subject to strong fiduciary duties. In the U.K. these 
obligations are much weaker (Mayer (2000)). 
Section 2.1.1: Ownership Structure 
A distinctive feature of the British corporate governance system is that the environment 
in which its public companies operate resembles the one which exists in the United 
States. Besides a well developed equity market, the U.S. and the U.K. also share several 
other common features in their corporate governance systems. For example, in the U.S. 
and the U.K. the share state is diffuse; in contrast, member states in the European Union 
often have a controlling shareholder. Furthermore as in the U.S., the system of ownership 
structure and control in the U.K. has been described as an “outsider system”; where 
 
22 As Wymeersch (2001) pointed out, in 1996 the U.K. had thirty six listed companies per one million 
people and the U.S. had thirty listed companies for the same number of people. In contrast, France had 
eight, Germany five, and Italy only four listed companies per one million people. In the same year, the 
market capitalization of the U.S. stock markets was approximately 95% of the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), in the U.K. the proportion was even higher, approximately 135% (Wymeersch (1998)). 
Whereas in other major European countries, the equivalent figure was around 35% or even less. Studies 
indicate that the corporate governance framework adopted in the United Kingdom is more stringent and 
much more developed than those in other European countries (Caprasse and Setareh (1998)). 
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dispersed ownership prevails. Another similarity between the U.S. and the British 
systems is that institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and 
mutual funds (investment or unit-trust), play an important role in the ownership structure 
of listed companies. In the United States institutional investors own about fifty percent of 
the equity market and in the United Kingdom this number is between sixty and seventy 
percent (Cheffins (1999)). Dispersed ownership structures can only arise and persist 
under highly developed legal systems that give strong legal protections to minority 
shareholders (Coffee (2000)). In the absence of any type of protection, investors will be 
reluctant to make investments, except to the extent that they can participate in a powerful 
blockholder group. Thus blockholding can be thought of as a substitute for legal 
protection against expropriation. The common law traditions of the U.S. and the U.K. 
have provided such protection; while civil law systems, present in most of the European 
and Scandinavian countries, do not provide such protection. 
 
In insider systems control is concentrated in the hands of a small number of investors 
with a variety of interests and agendas. Within the “insider systems” of Continental 
European countries like Germany, Austria, France, and Italy share-ownership tends to be 
concentrated in families or is held in large blocks by other corporations. Families control 
firms with minority, majority and super-majority blocks frequently through other firms. 
Also banks, trusts, or governmental entities sometimes hold controlling blocks of shares, 
consequently there may be a rise in cross-ownership between companies (Bergstrom, 
Hochfelt, Macey, Samuelsson (1995)). In a Franks and Mayer (1997) study, concerning 
Germany, it was found that 85,4% of the largest 171 quoted industrial companies had at 
least one shareholder with twenty-five percent or more of the outstanding shares of the 
company. Even more striking, was the fact that this same study found that in more than 
half of the sample companies there was a single majority shareholder. Thus, in contrast to 
the dispersed ownership structures present in the U.S. and U.K., concentration of 
ownership is one of the most distinctive features of the German equity market. 
 
Furthermore mandatory provisions of European company laws, protected by tariffs, non- 
recognition rules, and conflict of laws rules, by far exceed those of the United States in 
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the extent of the regulation they provide. Some authors also provide evidence of the 
participation of interest groups in the law-making process. The U.S. corporate 
governance system, on the other hand, with its long-standing common market, has a 
remarkable absence of such interest-group inspired rules in its corporation laws (Carney 
(1996)). 
Section 2.1.2: Capital Structure and Capital Requirements 
The capital structures of the U.S. and European systems are also quite different. Creditors 
of U.S. corporations enjoy a certain level of protection, but this protection is not as high 
as in the Continental European countries. Under U.S. law, contrary for example to 
German law, there exists no minimum capital requirement to incorporate a corporation; 
conversely minimum capital is a required standard in Continental Europe. Basically, once 
the company has registered and published the actual amount of its capital, the principle of 
publicity demands preservation, so far as possible, of the previously announced capital 
basis. Repayment of this capital is prohibited and a violation of this prohibition subjects 
the managers and all of the shareholders (not only those who benefited from the return of 
capital) to personal liability (The Second EC Company Law Directive). Sweden, for 
example, has recently doubled its minimum share capital for private companies, as has 
Finland. Denmark, by contrast recently reduced its minimum share capital requirements 
for private companies. Apart from the United Kingdom and Ireland and in direct contrast 
to the U.S., all European jurisdictions appear to impose minimum capital requirements 
for private companies. 
Section 2.1.3: Role of Financial Institutions 
Another distinctive feature in the structure of capital markets is that in the U.S. and in the 
U.K. financial institutions, such as pension funds, mutual funds and unit-trusts hold 
shares and play a large and still growing role in corporate governance. By contrast, in 
Continental Europe depository institutions like banks play a much stronger role 
(Hansmann and Kraakman (2000)). In Germany, for example, small investors purchase 
shares through banks and usually leave their shares on a bank deposit and periodically 
assign their proxies to these banks. Frequently, these banks make voting 
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recommendations, and shareholders very rarely disapprove these recommendations. Thus 
consequently banks, who usually vote with management, powerfully insulate German 
companies from hostile takeovers. Dutch law extends even further than German law, 
permitting the use of a depository intermediary to strip shareholders of their vote entirely. 
Section 2.1.4: Incorporation 
Another distinctive difference between U.S. law and Continental European law is the 
question of incorporation. Unlike in the United States, where corporations simply file the 
articles of incorporation with the secretary of state or another designated state agency, the 
formation of, for example a German or Austrian, stock corporation “Aktiengesellschaft” 
or a French “Société Anonyme” is a more complicated process. 
 
To summarize, the corporate global universe can broadly be broken down into two very 
different systems. First, the system of dispersed ownership, or “outsider system” which 
predominates in the United States and the United Kingdom; and secondly, the system of 
concentrated ownership, or “insider system”, which features either a controlling group or 
an interlocking network of shareholders who together control a broad collection of firms. 
Insider systems prevail in Continental Europe. The following table summarizes the main 
differences between these two systems. 
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Table 1:Main differences between the outsider and insider systems of corporate 
governance (Source: J. Weigand (1999)) 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OUTSIDER-system INSIDER-system 
Equity market capitalization high low 
Share ownership yield-oriented 
     short-term 
     widely dispersed 
value-oriented 
     long-term 
     concentrated 
Block shareholders rare common 
Changes in shareholders common rare 
Role of banks insignificant as controllers 
of company 
significant possibilities for 
control (creditors, owners, 
supervisory hoards) 
 short-term financing of 
company 
long-term financing of 
company 
Control of management by 
shareholders 
limited extensive 
Company goal high yields for shareholders secure market position 
 
Section 2.1.5: Takeover Barriers and Defensive Strategies 
Takeover barriers and defensive strategies are some of the obstacles which a proposed 
takeover may sometimes have to overcome. In the literature, there is a distinction 
between takeover barriers and defensive strategies. The former are often used in 
Continental Europe and aim to protect a company from hostile takeovers (as will be 
shown later). The latter are widely used in the U.S. and include both pre-bid and post-bid 
defenses. Defensive strategies can contribute to shareholder value creation, if they are 
directed (as is often the case) at maximizing the bid’s price or at frustrating bids which do 
not maximize wealth. If used to entrench the target’s managers, defensive strategies are 
functionally similar to takeover barriers. 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
30
 
There are many types of barriers. In Europe the distinction is frequently made between 
structural and technical barriers to takeovers. The former reflect existing conditions in the 
economic environment (Gilson (1992)), including circumstances such as the ownership 
concentration in families and small groups, the influence of large banks and the relatively 
limited role of stock exchanges in corporate financing (Jenkinson and Mayer (1994)). 
Conversely, technical barriers are part of the corporate governance structure, as they are 
erected by statutes and by the companies’ memoranda and articles of association, which 
specify the legal rules and allocate powers between the various interested parties 
(shareholders, management and labor). Techniques such as pyramidal groups, cross-
shareholdings and the issuing of non-voting shares are commonly used technical barriers. 
Not only do these barriers contribute to the separation of ownership and control, but they 
also protect management and the controlling shareholders from the risk of unfriendly 
takeovers. Other tools specifically aimed at discouraging takeover bids are often seen 
with respect to share transfer restrictions and voting caps. Examples of barriers with 
widespread use in Europe include: (1) share transfer restrictions, (2) voting restrictions, 
(3) voting agreements, (4) cross-shareholding, (5) disclosure rules.  
 
Any comparison between the American and the European legal systems shows a 
substantial diversity as to the range of defensive tools available to obstruct any takeover 
attempt. This diversity appears to be a consequence of the different characteristics of 
corporate law, evident between the two regions. Corporate law tends to be more enabling 
in the U.S. and less concerned with creditors’ protection than in Europe (Carney (1997)). 
The Second European Directive, for instance, severely restricts the repurchasing of the 
company’s own shares, thus narrowing the scope of buy-backs as defensive measures. 
Furthermore the same directive provides for pre-emptive rights in the case of an increase 
of the company’s capital, making it difficult for the target to allot shares to a friendly 
party in the event of a hostile bid. As argued for in the U.K. (but the comment could be 
extended to Europe in general), “it is clear that companies have relatively few defenses 
available in the event of a hostile bid. Target companies are typically limited to financial 
announcements (such as updated dividends and profit forecasts); disposals or revaluations 
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of assets; appeals to various regulators, or finding a white knight” (Jenkinson and Mayer 
(1994)). 
Section 2.2: Diversity in European Union Member States’ Laws  
When considering institutional differences between the member states of the European 
Union, it is important to note that within the European Union, contrary to the United 
States, the legal systems belong to different families of law. Insofar as corporation laws 
are concerned, it is difficult to divide the civil-law world into “code families” or other 
convenient groupings. However, at the outset it can be stated that the British legal system 
is based on common law whereas Continental European states have a civil law tradition. 
Within the civil law systems, both Roman and Germanic legal traditions are represented. 
 
As mentioned above, the concentration of ownership is one of the most distinctive 
features of Continental European “insider systems” and distinguishes financial markets 
on the Continent from those in the United Kingdom, where ownership is much more 
diffuse. One should note however, that despite the very high degree of concentration of 
shareholder voting power in Continental Europe relative to the United Kingdom, the 
concentration of ownership is still considerably higher in the United Kingdom than in the 
United States. The most significant differences are apparent with regard to worker 
participation requirements and shareholder rights. Both worker participation and 
shareholder rights can be characterized as either strict or liberal. Whilst strict employee 
participation statutes give labor a larger voice in management, liberal laws allow 
management to exclude employees. Furthermore strict shareholder rights regimes provide 
for more shareholder oversight of management activities and correspondingly greater 
shareholder rights, whereas liberal regimes provide for less oversight and fewer 
shareholder rights. 
 
For example both Germany and the Netherlands have relatively strict worker 
participation statutes, but offer fewer shareholder rights. In these countries and also in 
Denmark, Austria, Finland and Sweden employees or their representatives are involved 
in the board’s decision making process. By contrast, there are no rules on co-
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determination in Belgium, Italy, Portugal, or the U.K.; also there is no co-determination 
in the U.S. Most co-determination systems are based on the dual board structure, mostly 
in an obligatory form. The German and the Dutch systems of co-determination are the 
most complex (Wymeersch (2001)). The German laws on labor participation generally 
apply to all German private corporations (GmbHs) with more than 500 employees, and to 
all stock corporations (AGs). 
 
Sweden, similar to Germany requires employee representation on company boards. 
Sweden requires company boards to include up to three labor directors selected by the 
trade unions; although it also mandates that union directors must excuse themselves when 
the board addresses contentious issues of labor relations. Other European states such as 
Spain and Greece, for example, only mandate employee directors for state-owned 
enterprises (Hansmann and Kraakman (2000)). 
 
In this context, the Fifth Company Law (Company Structure and Employee 
Participation), that was proposed in 1983 as directive for EEC countries, is interesting. 
This proposed directive would have harmonized the governance structure for “public” 
corporations but it encountered opposition and has not been adopted as yet because the 
proposal included some form of worker participation. The proposed directive coveted the 
company structure, the management organ and supervisory organ, the general meeting, 
the adoption and audit of the annual accounts and general provisions. Two highly 
controversial aspects of these rules were the mandatory creation of a two-tier board 
structure consisting of a managing organ and a supervisory organ and mandatory 
provisions for employee’s representation on the supervisory board for companies with 
more than 500 employees. As a result of these controversial aspects today the proposal 
for a Fifth Company Law Directive appears to be abandoned. 
 
For the same reasons as the proposed Fifth Directive, the proposal to permit the creation 
of a “European Company” (Societas Europaea, SE) had until the turn of the century made 
no headway in the preceding decade. However, at the Nice summit of December 2000, 
the realization of the European Company seemed possible for the first time since its 
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introduction in 1970. On 20 December 2000, a common position was agreed upon by the 
Council. Under the terms of these agreements, reached thirty years after the first 
Commission proposal, the statute for a European Company will give firms operating in 
several member states the opportunity to set up a public limited-liability company. This 
European Company will work as a single operator throughout the European Union on the 
basis of a single legislative and management system, instead of being subject to the 
national legislation of each member state in which it would have subsidiaries. For 
companies operating on an internal market scale, the European Company status will bring 
significant administrative savings and a legal structure suited to the large market in which 
they will develop. 
 
In October 2001, the European Company Statute was adopted and has become reality in 
the EU. The European Company statute is established by two pieces, namely a regulation 
and a related directive concerning worker involvement in European Companies. The 
disputes concerning worker involvement were solved in the following way: The directive 
on worker involvement requires negotiations on the involvement of employees with a 
special body representing all employees of the companies concerned. If negotiations do 
not lead to a mutually-satisfactory arrangement, a set of standard principles (laid down in 
the Annexe to the directive) will apply. In some special cases standard principles on 
participation of workers will apply. This is the case when (1) a mutually satisfactory 
agreement among managers and employee representatives cannot be reached and (2) 
where the companies involved in the creation of a SE were previously covered by 
participation rules. If the SE, for example, is created by a merger, standard principles on 
participation will apply, when at least 25% of employees had the right to participate 
before the merger. The ultimate creation of a European Company has shown how 
difficult the finding of compromise solutions among European member states, with their 
different corporate cultures, can be. However, with the adoption of the European 
Company Statute it will finally be possible to establish a single company under 
Community law, and to operate throughout the EU with one set of rules rather than under 
the different laws of European member states. 
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Another example of divergent attitudes among EU member states relates to shareholder 
rights. Concerning shareholder rights, the United Kingdom, in contrast to Germany, ranks 
these rights highly. The German corporate governance model is perhaps most often 
described as embodying a “stakeholder culture” in which the purpose of the company is 
to advance not only the interests of shareholders but also the interests of company 
managers, employees and creditors (Andre, T.J. Jr. (1998)); whereas the concept of 
“shareholder value” dominates in the United Kingdom. In fact, in recent times the term 
“shareholder value” has also become a slogan for leading German companies. 
Nevertheless shareholder interests do not have the same importance in Germany or other 
Continental European countries, as they do in the U.K. Also some German managers are 
still openly skeptical of an Anglo-Saxon intervention that challenges the social consensus 
mentality of the typical German company23. 
 
Generally, it should be noted that greater shareholder rights imply a greater likelihood of 
a successful takeover attempt because shareholders usually benefit from bid premiums 
and thus have a favorable attitude towards takeovers. The United Kingdom, which has 
the greatest occurrence of hostile takeovers in the European Union, is very solicitous to 
shareholders in the takeover context (Stith (1991)). The defenses available to a British 
target company facing a potential hostile takeover are much more modest than defenses 
in other European member states. Differences in regulation therefore confer substantial 
control benefits on minorities in the United Kingdom (and also in the United States) but 
not for example in Germany, where large block-shareholders dominate. 
 
Given the pattern of differences among the laws of the member states of the EU, 
especially in regard to worker participation rules and shareholder rights, it seems that 
managers cannot have it both ways. If management avoids the monitoring by 
shareholders, it must give in to worker demands for representation on the board of 
directors. In this context the questions of which jurisdiction could be the most successful 
 
23 This was also exemplified by Jurgen Schremp, chairman of the board of directors of the former Daimler-
Benz AG, now Daimler-Chrysler, when he originally converted to the principle of shareholder value having 
espoused the concept since the late 1990s (Schmid (1996)). 
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in attracting corporate charters in the European Union and whether there is a need to 
harmonize takeover laws becomes more apparent. 
 
The European institutional framework reflects that the crucial determinants of the 
respective “comparative advantages” which companies enjoy are the differences in the 
organization of capital markets, the rules of company law and the forms of employee 
participation in the European member states. 
 
Section 3: The Model 
Having reviewed the relevant theories, it is time to formalize the main question of this 
research, namely: the influence that legal parameters have on the post-takeover value of a 
firm. As mentioned above there is a large number of researches regarding the post-
takeover value of a firm, as well as many other researches that focus on the legal 
framework and investigate the general influence of laws. The large amount of research 
shows that the legal environment does indeed influence the outcome of takeover at a high 
level. However, formalization of this influence has rarely (almost never) become the 
main theme of any research. 
 
I argue that it is possible to formalize some legal factors that influence the outcome on 
the value of a firm after their implementation. The main intuition behind this research is 
to show the impact of toeholds, defensive strategies and the presence of large 
shareholders upon the post-takeover value of a firm. It is argued that the possibility of 
implementation of defensive strategies and the presence of large blockholders increase 
post-takeover value significantly, at the same time their presence lowers takeover 
probability dramatically. But the possibility to buy shares on the open market gives the 
Rival more incentives to make a tender offer. 
 
A large amount of the theoretical literature deals with the dynamics of the tender offer 
process in various settings. And the free-rider problem became a benchmark within much 
of these researches. A prominent theme in this literature is the role of the initial 
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ownership structure, in particular the impact of blockholders. Many papers analyze 
takeovers where either a bidder or the incumbent management owns an initial stake; 
whilst the role of blockholders as tendering shareholders has so far received little 
attention in the theoretical literature. The possibility of implementing various weapons of 
defense has been widely discussed in the works of many scholars. Toeholds strategies 
have received significant attention as well. Despite this, the joint effect of these two 
factors has not been discussed as yet. As pointed out above, blockholding, defensive 
strategies and toeholds (mainly disclosure rules) constitute the main differences between 
the two corporate governance systems of the U.S. and Europe. I will look at the outcome, 
namely the post-takeover value of a firm for minority shareholders, which is brought by 
these factors. The formal model will be analyzed in order to obtain significant results. 
Section 3.1: Basic Model 
To investigate the impact of these factors on the value of a firm, the researcher has 
decided to apply the analysis forwarded in the working paper “Minority Blocks and 
Takeover Premia” by Mike Burkant, Denis Gromb and Fausto Panunzi (2005). In this 
work the authors want to explore the aspect of block ownership in takeovers. They 
analyze ‘takeovers of firms owned by a majority of atomistic shareholders and one 
minority blockholder who does not counter-bid but merely decides whether to tender or 
retain his shares’ (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). The main analyzed question is 
the impact of the minority blockholder on the firm valuation after takeover. As a result of 
the paper the authors conclude that in the presence of such a minority blockholder the 
bidder can be forced to offer a higher premium compared to the case of a fully dispersed 
firm (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). 
 
The model of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi deals with the analysis of companies that are 
owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder and are in the process 
of a takeover. All shareholders can tender or refrain from tendering. The tendering 
decision of the blockholder and the small shareholders interact with each other. The 
authors argue that as private benefit extraction is inefficient, the post-takeover share 
value increases with the bidder’s shareholding. It is also worth adding that in a successful 
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takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the 
amount needed, such that the post-takeover share value matches the bid price. 
 
Before stating the model put forward by Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) I introduce 
the notation that is used in the following analysis24: 
α  - stake of the company owned by the blockholder; 
Iv  - share value under incumbent manager; 
v  - blockholder’s valuation of the firm (per share); 
Rv  - rival’s valuation of the company (per share); 
Sv  - share value under incumbent manager after the implementation of defensive 
strategies; 
Bv  - blockholder’s valuation in the case of the implementation of defensive strategies; 
p  - probability of success of the defense; 
λ  - the size of the toehold; 
d  - the set of the defensive strategies; 
Λ  - private benefits for the blockholder; 
φ  - private benefits of control for the rival; 
)(φl  - deadweight loss associated with rival’s private benefit extraction; 
γ  - the fraction of shares tendered by the blockholder, [ ]αγ ,0∈ ; 
η  - the fraction of shares tendered the small shareholders, [ ]αη −∈ 1,0 . 
β  - the stake of the company acquired by the rival. 
 
According to Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) a blockholder in the model owns a 
fraction %50<α  of shares and a number of small shareholders who owns the rest of the 
shares, )1( α− . A Rival approaches the firm to gain a control. The Rival has no initial 
stake in the company, as well as all shares are assumed to be one-vote shares. The Rival 
                                                 
24 In order to investigate the impact of various defensive weapons, toehold strategies and blockholders on 
the post-takeover value of a firm with particular references to the differing legal environments present 
within the U.S. and Europe, I have decided to apply the analysis. Consequently the following section 
presents a modified version of the formal model put forward by Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005). 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
38
 
needs to attract at least 50% of the shares through a public offer to takeover the company. 
The shareholders either refrain from tendering their shares or sell them. In this model no 
further options or choices are available to any player (no counter bids, no purchasing of 
shares on the open market, etc.). 
 
Under current management the value of the firm is  per share. Iv
 
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) denote the total per-share value of the blockholder 
stake as αΛ+= Ivv , where  is blockholder’s private benefits. It is assumed that 
. For , the blockholder and the small shareholders have similar interests. 
Λ
0>Λ 0=Λ
 
In the analysis put forward by Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) the takeover process 
falls in three parts: 
 
First, the Rival makes a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional, unrestricted tender offer; he 
submits a price  at which he has to buy all tendered shares. The Rival also pays a cost 
of . 
b
0>c
 
Then, the shareholders simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to tender. 
The blockholder knows that his decision may affect the outcome. In contrast small 
shareholders do not perceive themselves as pivotal for the outcome of the tender offer. 
 
In the last stage, if less than 1/2 the shares are tendered, the offer fails and nothing 
changes. Otherwise, the rival gains control and holds 2
1≥β  of the shares. 
 
If the bid is successful the Rival allocates the firm’s resources as follows: they are used to 
generate either security benefits which accrue to all shareholders or private benefits 
which only the rival enjoys. Therefore the rival chooses [ ]1,0∈φ  such that security 
benefits are Rv)1( φ−  while private benefits are Rvl ))(( φφ − . Where deadweight loss 
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associated with private benefits extraction, )(φl , is strictly increasing and convex on 
, with ,  and . [ 1,0 ] 0)0( =l 0)0(' =l 1)1(' >l
 
In addition, in previous works, especially those of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998) 
and Shliefer and Wolfenzon (2002), ‘it was argued that the extraction of private benefits 
is inefficient and its marginal return decreases. [Furthermore] private benefit extraction 
affects all shares equally’ (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005), p. 7). 
 
Tender Offers and Minority Blockholders 
Resource Allocation and Shareholder Wealth 
 
In the case of a successful tender offer bid the Rival owns a fraction 2
1≥β  of the 
shares. Furthermore he must decide upon a fraction φ  of resources, which are to be his 
exclusive benefits. The private benefit extraction causes a deadweight loss of  )(φl . 
Consequently the Rival must choose φ  in such way as to maximize his payoff 
RR vlv ))(()1( φφφβ −+− . The solution of this maximization problem is denoted by . It 
is obvious that the higher the value of 
βφ
φ , the lower the value of all the shares. From the 
first-order condition )(')1( φβ l=−  it is seen that with an increase in β , the rival’s 
private benefits  decreases and the post-takeover share value  
increases (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). 
Rvl ))((
ββ φφ − Rv)1( βφ−
 
In the work of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi the authors restrict their attention to 
‘parameter constellations such that any successful bid is value-increasing’ (2005, p.8). 
The term successful bid is therefore understood to be a value-increasing bid: 
. IR vv ≥− )1( βφ
 
Tendering and Bid Price 
In equilibrium, the shareholders expectations must coincide with the actual outcome. 
These expectations can be divided into: αˆ - expectation about the fraction tendered by the 
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rival and ηˆ - expectation about the fraction tendered by the small shareholders, and 
  expectation about the bidder’s final shareholding. Taken together these 
expectations describe the tendering behavior of the shareholders. 
ηαβ ˆˆˆ +=
 
According to Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) there are only two equilibrium 
outcomes. Either the success or the failure of the bid. To describe the equilibrium 
outcome as a function of the bid price, the authors defined: 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−≡ + RR vvvb )1(;min;)1(max* 2
1
2
1 αφφ . 
In other words the equilibrium outcome is obtained by choosing the highest payoff for 
small shareholders. This equilibrium is the dominant equilibrium outcome (Burkant, 
Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). 
 
Further expending their analysis Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) prove that for all 
bids, there exists a single dominant rational expectations equilibrium outcome: 
i) For , the bid fails.  *bb <
ii) For , the bid succeeds. [ Rvbb *,∈ ]
• The blockholder tenders all his shares  
• The small shareholders tender a fraction η  of shares such that 
. Rvb )1(
ηαφ +−=
iii) For,  the bid succeeds and all shares are tendered. (Burkant, Gromb and 
Panunzi (2005), p. 9) 
Rvb >
 
It was also shown that failure is a rational expectations equilibrium outcome for all bids 
. Irrespective of the price offered and given that an offer is conditional and shareholders 
are atomistic, failure of the tender offer is always an equilibrium. However in any 
successful bid equilibrium case, the following always holds: . To be able to 
avoid the free-rider problem the Rival must always bid at least the post-takeover share 
value (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005)).  
b
Rvb )1(
βφ−≥
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Furthermore Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) have shown that in any equilibrium in 
which the bid succeeds, the blockholder sells his entire block. 
 
The only equilibrium outcome in which all bids [ ]Rvbb *,∈  succeed, is when αγ =  and 
. This outcomes dominates failure for the small shareholders. It holds as 
well when . In addition, in this case all the shares will be tendered (Burkant, 
Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). 
Rvb )1(
ηαφ +−=
Rvb >
 
Optimal Bid 
 
The Rival’s optimal bid is equal to  - the equilibrium bid. However, due to the free-
raider problem, even with this optimal bid the Rival cannot make any profit. Therefore 
the only source of gain, for the Rival, is his private benefits. However, considering the 
properties of the deadweight loss function, the larger the stake of the company the raider 
acquires the smaller private benefits he has. Hence, the higher the bid price the more 
shares are tendered in a successful takeover. Thus, it is optimal for the Rival to bid the 
lowest price ensuring success, i.e.,  
*b
*bb =  (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). 
 
The Effect of a Blockholder 
 
According to Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005) to obtain control over the company in 
the case of a fully dispersed ownership )0( =α , the Rival aim at attracting the minimum 
amount of shares required; i.e. exactly 1/2. In this case the post-takeover share value is 
equal to Rv)1( 2
1
φ−  , which is the exactl amount the Rival must offer to induce 
shareholders to tender half their shares (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998)). 
 
Compared to the case of a fully dispersed ownership )0( =α , the presence of a minority 
blockholder affects the equilibrium outcome as follows: 
i) For Rvv )1( 2
1φ−≤ , the blockholder has no impact on the outcome. 
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ii) For Rvv )1( 2
1φ−> , the presence of a blockholder implies 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of a takeover; 
• A lower takeover probability (Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005), p. 14). 
 
Even when the blockholder’s value exceeds the per-share value under the current 
management ( Rvv )1( 2φ−> 1 ) a bid matching the post-takeover share value when 50% of 
the shares are tendered ( Rvb )1( 2φ−= 1 ) succeeds. In this case the blockholder enjoys no 
or little private benefits, since all the bids are value-increasing. Therefore the presence of 
the blockholder is not crucial for the outcome, since the bidder offers the same bid price 
to acquire the same fraction of shares (50%) as he does when the target is fully dispersed 
(Burkant, Gromb and Panunzi (2005)). 
 
Whilst in the case when the blockholders share-value of his stake exceeds the post-
takeover share value when a half of the shares are tendered, due to substantial private 
benefits - his presence does matter. Hence the bidder has to increase the bid price to the 
level where either the blockholder accepts the offer or the Rival can acquire enough 
shares from the small shareholders to gain control. This situation is preferred by the small 
shareholders, since such a blockholder brings benefits by necessitating a higher takeover 
premia. At the same time, however, it reduces takeover likelihood (Burkant, Gromb and 
Panunzi (2005)). 
Section 3.2: New Parameters 
In the literature review the author pointed out the main differences (toeholds, large 
shareholders, defensive strategies) between the corporate governance systems of the U.S. 
and EU. In this section I will continue the analysis started in the first section. But here I 
will look at it from a different angle – the formal analysis of the impact of these major 
differences. To compare these significant differences, the author introduces new 
parameters to the model described above. 
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]
I will look at the effect of new parameters separately and then all together in one model. 
This is done to understand the impact of different regulatory tools on the value of a firm 
after takeover. By the term different regulatory tools I assume such instruments as those 
which allow the regulator to control, for example, the trade of share that is owned by 
shareholders whose stake exceeds 10% (the E.U. practice). 
Section 3.2.1: Defensive Strategies 
One of these parameters will indicate the possibility to implement takeover defenses. For 
simplicity I will operate only with value increasing defensive strategies as poison pills, 
since all the agents on the market are thought to be rational. It must be said that some 
value increasing defensive strategies may be implemented in Europe. But an arsenal of 
these sorts of strategies available and the probability of a successful implementation of 
these defenses is obviously much less likely in Europe than in the U.S., because of the 
above-mentioned barriers, both technical and structural. There is a bigger arsenal of such 
value increasing weapons available for American companies. The defensive strategies are 
mostly used as another source to strengthen the bargaining position of shareholders. 
Hence, shareholders have more arguments to bargain for a better price. Parameters  
and are introduced. They are the benefit from defensive strategies and the probability 
of the legal use of these defensive strategies respectively. can take any values in an 
interval from 0 to 1, . In other words, if is equal to 0 then it is legally 
impossible to use any of the defensive strategies, or one can say that defensive strategies 
are unavailable to the economic agent. Let  refer to the benefit from the use of 
defensive strategies. It depends on defensive tactics chosen by a firm, but it is out of the 
scope of this paper to discuss the influence of any particular strategy. In other words, 
 can be understood as the added value to the price of a share. This parameter fully 
depends on intensity of use of the strategy. 
)(dg
p
p
[ 1,0∈p p
)(dg
)(dg
)(⋅g  is a strictly increasing and concave 
function on [ , with . )∞,0 0)0( =g
These two parameters are included in the model in the following way: 
)(dgpvv IS ⋅+= , 
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where - per-share value of a firm for all shareholders under incumbent manager;  is 
per-share value for all shareholders after implementation of a set of the defensive 
strategies. In other words, shareholders are willing to increase their value and this can be 
done by means of the defensive strategies available. At the same moment the added value 
does not only depend on the set of strategies, but also depends on the probability of 
successful implementation of them.  has the following properties: 
Iv Sv
Sv 0)( ≥=∂
∂ dg
p
vS  - 
increases with the probability of the successful use of defensive strategies. It is obvious 
that in the environment where the arsenal and legal framework allow the use of defensive 
strategies, first, the probability of success of the defensive strategy is much higher, and 
consequently, the per-share value increases as well. )(dgp
d
vS ′⋅=∂
∂ , where  by 
assumption, therefore, 
0)( ≥′ dg
0)( ≥′⋅=∂
∂ dgp
d
vS  - increases with intense use of defensive tools. 
As it is said above, shareholders will increase their value more if they use more intensive 
defensive strategies, or a combination of them. In other words, the more effort 
shareholders put into defense the more value they add. 
 
Effect of Implementation of Defensive Strategies 
 
Now I want to analyze the impact of implementation of defensive strategies on per-share 
value of the firm; in order to understand the possible consequences of this for 
shareholders. 
In the case of no defense strategies with fully dispersed ownership ( 0= )α , the Rival 
would have as a target exactly half of the shares and would offer Rvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 2
1
1 φ  and this 
is the bid that the Rival must offer to induce shareholders to tender half of their shares. 
 
Relative to the case of fully dispersed ownership and absence of defensive strategies, the 
possibility of implementation of such strategies and its arsenal affects the equilibrium 
outcome as follows: 
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i) For RS vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , implementation of defensive strategies increases share value. 
ii) For RS vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , the possibility to implement defensive strategies implies: 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of takeover; 
• A lower probability of takeover. 
For 0=α , and no defensive strategies available RRd vvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 2
1
2
1
* 11max φφ . 
For RS vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , RSR vvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 2
1
2
1
1,1max* φφ .This new share value is 
higher than in the case of a fully dispersed ownership: , where  - is optimal bid 
price in the case of a fully dispersed ownership, no defensive strategies available, no 
large shareholder, no toeholds. But  and , hence, . In other words 
implementation of defensive tools leads to higher bids and higher share value. 
Id vb ≥* *db
IS vv ≥ Svb ≥* ** dbb ≥
For RS vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , RSSR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −>=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 2
1
2
1
1,1max* φφ . It leads to a higher bid 
price than in the pure case of a fully dispersed ownership and higher β . But these all 
imply lower profits for the Rival and therefore a lower probability of takeover. The 
takeover probability decreases with any increase in the probability of success of defense, 
which is itself a cause of the increase in added value from the use of the defensive 
strategy. 
Section 3.2.2: Large Shareholder 
A different problem is created by blockholders when they own a minority stake of the 
share capital, but one that is sufficient to participate in the control of the target. If the 
private benefits of control are relatively high (as happens in countries where investor 
protection is not yet fully developed25), the target blockholders might resist the takeover 
for reasons other than shareholder value maximization. The outcome (if the blockholders’ 
                                                 
25 See Zingales (1994) 
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vote prevails, also as a consequence of the other shareholders’ apathy) could be similar to 
that obtained in the U.S. when managers resist a takeover mainly for entrenchment 
purposes. 
 
The presence of private benefits is crucial in several aspects. As mentioned above, 
shareholders tend to increase their stock in a legal environment which lacks the legal 
protection of investors. In this way (in increasing the stake of the company) they protect 
themselves. In other words, they try to neglect this legal inefficiency. By having the 
majority or supermajority or at least a stake close to controlling, investors can influence 
almost all the processes inside the firm and in particular can assign managers to key 
positions or can even assign a full board of directors. 
 
From this point of view it is logical to assume the increase of private benefits from 
acquiring an extra stake in the company. As in the basic model, α  is the fraction of the 
firm owned by a blockholder, or a number of shareholders acting in coalition. Consistent 
with the assumption made above about the lack of legal protection, I will assume that 
private benefits rise with an increase in a stake, which gives a significant increase in the 
blockholder valuation of his stake. Formally it is as follows: 
α
α )(Λ+= SB vv , 
where private benefit function )(⋅Λ is strictly increasing and concave on [ , with 
. 
]1,0
0)0( =Λ
 
Effect of a Large Shareholder 
 
This is done because of the same reason, to show the impact of such a regulatory action 
upon blockholding. The actual effect of a large shareholder depends on his stake. If it is 
less than the 50% of all shares, then we have the same case as in Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi (2005), fully dispersed ownership and a minority blockholder: 
i) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , the blockholder has no impact on the outcome. 
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ii) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , the presence of a blockholder implies 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of a takeover; 
• A lower takeover probability. 
 
For 0=α , and no defensive strategies available 
RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 2
1
2
1
2
1
11,min,1max* φφφ . 
For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , RBR vvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 2
1
2
1
1,1max* φφ . Hence, we can see no 
impact on the post-takeover value. 
For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −>⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= + 2
1
2
1
2
1
11,min,1max* φφφ α . 
Compared to the case of fully dispersed ownership, this gives a higher bid price and a 
higher β . But it is also associated with lower profits for the Rival and this in turn implies 
a lower probability of takeover. 
 
The presence of a majority blockholder changes the entire picture. The majority 
blockholder has over or at least 50% of all shares. This is why his presence becomes so 
important; especially given the possibility to generate private benefits. By assumption, 
the larger the stake a blockholder controls the larger the private benefits he extracts. The 
blockholder could appoint a loyal manager to the board, securing his investments in the 
business, when there is a lack of protection for investors. 
 
The presence of a majority blockholder becomes crucial for the Rival, since he cannot 
take over the firm without bidding for the shares of the majority blockholder. 
i) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , takeover is successful. 
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ii) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , the presence of a majority blockholder implies 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of a takeover; 
• A lower takeover probability. 
 
For 0=α , and no defensive strategies available 
RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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⎫
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1
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1
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1
11,min,1max* φφφ . 
For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , RBR vvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= ++ )1(2
1)1(
2
1
1,1max*
αα φφ . Hence, we can say 
that the takeover will always be successful, but there is no impact on the post-takeover 
value in this case. Besides this, the majority shareholder will tender his entire stake plus 
half of the atomistic shareholders will sell their shares. Compared to the case of no 
blockholders this leads to a higher β . And this situation is very attractive for the Rival. 
Since he got rid of the free-rider problem and gained control over the firm. However, on 
the other hand, there is a decrease in his private benefits because he internalizes more 
inefficiency by acquiring a higher stake of the firm. 
For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −>⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
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⎧
⎪⎭
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= + 2
1
2
1
2
1
11,min,1max* φφφ α . 
Compared to the case of fully dispersed ownership this gives a higher bid price and 
higher β . But it is also associated with much lower profits for the Rival and this in turn 
implies a much lower probability (almost an impossibility) of takeover. 
Section 3.2.3: Toehold 
Relatively little attention has been paid to the strategies a potential bidder may use prior 
to announcing a tender offer. A commonly used method is the open market purchase of 
shares (toeholds) before the official announcement of the offer. 
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In this work I will use a single parameter that shows a stake of shares purchased on the 
open market26. 
 
Let λ  be the fraction of shares available to the bidder to buy on the open market. It is 
assumed that the Rival can buy any number of shares according to the law. After he 
reaches a limit he would need to either ask the regulator to let him buy more shares or to 
stop buying and announce the official tender offer. The Rival chooses λ  by solving the 
value maximization problem. 
 
The value maximization function of the bidder becomes: 
( )( )( ) ( RRI vlvv )(1 )φφφλβλ −+−−+  
 
The solution to the first-order condition )()(1 φλβ l ′=−− is denoted by . When 
choosing 
λβφ −
φ , the value of the shareholders’ share and the share of the bidder himself is 
reduced. It is obvious from the solution of the first-order that with an increase in )( λβ −  
the bidder internalizes the inefficiencies and extracts less private benefits, which in turn 
leads to a higher value of the firm. It is obvious that the bidder will use this opportunity 
to buy shares on the open market for a price less than his valuation of the firm, and 
therefore increase the extraction of private benefits. It is his only opportunity to make a 
profit, since to induce shareholders to tender their shares the Rival should offer them the 
maximum valuation. Hence, the only source of profit for the Rival is private benefits, 
which increase with any increase in λ . Hence, . βλβ φφ ≥−
 
As it was said, the Rival should think carefully about the purchase of shares on the open 
market. It might be in the interest of the Rival to use the opportunity to buy shares on the 
open market and therefore increase his private benefits. On the other hand, if he reaches a 
certain limit, he will need to disclose his identity and further plans. This, in turn, might 
                                                 
26 There is a second possible method of study the influence of toehold strategies which is more complicated 
and implies the use of game-theoretical model of signaling. Since shareholders could take the disclosure 
information as a signal of the bidder’s valuation of the firm, and therefore increase their expectation about 
the post-takeover value of the firm. 
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serve as a signal for shareholders to increase their expectations about the value of the 
firm, and therefore neglect or even overvalue the private benefit that the Rival might get 
by means of toeholds27. 
 
To gain control over the firm the Rival has to obtain at least 50% of shares either by 
buying them on the open market, or through the tender offer or by a combination of these 
two possibilities. In this work the author assumes the mix of the open market purchases 
and the tender offer. Hence, if 
2
1)( <+ λβ , then the takeover fails and the incumbent 
management team continues to run the firm. The wealth of the small shareholder is still 
 and the blockholder’s worth . Iv Bv
 
Since it is assumed that all the shareholders are rational, they will not tender their shares 
in the case when they do not benefit. Therefore, the Rival should offer them at least the 
same per-share value as they have before the tender offer. In other words, shareholders 
will only consider value increasing bids. Here, a value increasing bid is considered to be 
successful if it satisfies the following inequality: 
SR vv ≥− − )1( λβφ  
 
Tendering and Bid Price 
 
As before the tendering behavior of the shareholders depends on their rational 
expectation about the fraction tendered by large and small shareholders,αˆ  and ηˆ  
respectively, plus their expectation about the fraction of shares bought on the open 
market by the bidder, . Opposed to the basic model the final expectation about the 
bidder’s shareholding is now as follows: , where , so that 
. This expectation should coincide with the actual outcome in equilibrium. 
λˆ
βλ ˆˆˆ +=r ηαβ ˆˆˆ +=
ηαλ ˆˆˆˆ ++=r
 
                                                 
27 The result obtained by Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994) is that in signaling equilibrium almost every type 
of bidder will purchase a positive toehold to signal his valuation. However, even when a rival is likely to 
buy shares, other elements of the problem may still induce the use of only modest open market purchases. 
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The equilibrium outcome is very much the same as in the basic model I described above, 
except that the bid price is now different. It is now dependent on the choice of λ , not 
only on α  and β : 
 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−≡ −+− RBR vvvb )1(;min;)1(max* 2
1
2
1 λαλ φφ  
 
For all bids , there exists only one dominant rational expectations equilibrium outcome: b
i) For  the bid is considered unsuccessful. *bb <
ii) For , the bid succeeds. [ Rvbb *;∈ ]
• the blockholder tenders all his shares )( αγ = . 
• the small shareholders tender a fraction η  of shares such that 
. Rvb )1(
βφ−=
iii) For , the bid succeeds and all shares are tendered. Rvb >
 
From here it is obvious that the only equilibrium bid is the one that satisfies the 
following: 
Rvb )1(
λβφ −−≥  
 
If the price is lower than the post takeover value of the firm then no atomistic shareholder 
will tender. This is well known as the free-rider phenomenon. Shareholders must be 
convinced to tender their shares, this is only possible when the price exceeds or is equal 
to the post-takeover share value.  
 
As before a large shareholder, assuming a successful bid, sells his entire stake. This could 
be shown as follows: if a rival bid succeeds, then the large shareholder payoff is 
. Since  as we stated above, and RB vb )1)((
ληγφγαγπ −+−−+= 0)1( ≥−− −+ Rvb ληγφ
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0<∂
∂ −+
γ
φ ληγ  it follows from the assumption we have made about the φ  function, we 
have: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 011 >∂−∂−+−−=∂∂
−+
−+
γ
φγαφγ
π ληγληγ R
R
B vvb . 
 
Therefore, for the result to be optimal it is required that αγ =  - the large shareholder 
tenders all his shares. The same result was obtained by Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992). 
They stated that an investor with a higher stake has more incentives to tender. As they 
showed in their model with a finite number of shareholders, a blockholder increases the 
chance of success by tendering some shares and thereby increasing the expected value of 
his retained shares. Additional gain from selling decreases when the number of retained 
shares becomes smaller. As a result the blockholder will only tender part of his shares in 
equilibrium. But according to Cadsby and Maynes (1998), partial tendering strategies are 
usual in theory, but are rarely seen in practice, where shareholders are more inclined to 
either tender all or none of their shares. 
 
Optimal Bid 
The Rival has to optimize his own strategy of bidding. By assumption, all the agents are 
rational. Hence, the Rival knows the expectation of shareholders and will bid at least . 
But the optimal bid is always equal to , because if it exceeds  then the Rival will 
have less profit: , the Rival’s payoff from a successful takeover is 
*b
*b *b
*bb ≥
( )( ) ( ) cbvvlv IRRR −−−−+−+= −−− βλφφφβλπ λβλβλβ )(1 ; for , [ ]Rvbb *;∈
( ) Rvb λβφ −−= 1  so that ( ) ( ) cvvlv IRRR −−−+−= −−− λφφφλπ λβλβλβ )(1  which is 
decreasing in β  and therefore in b . With  shareholders will want to tender all 
their shares so that 
Rvb >
λβ +=1 . In other words the Rival will acquire all the shares, taking 
into account very little possibility for λ  to become significantly large and the properties 
of the φ  function, . Therefore the Rival’s payoff is: 001 ⎯⎯ →⎯λ= →− λβ φφ
( ) ( ) cvbvv RIRR −−−−= βλπ . The last two components on the right hand side are 
strictly negative. The first right hand side component is greater or equal to zero. In the 
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overwhelming majority of cases, this profit will be negative. As we see from the analysis 
the Rival should offer exactly  to make his bid optimal. *b
 
The Rival is unable to make a significant gain on tendered shares basically because of the 
free-rider problem. The only source of his profit is private benefits and as it was shown in 
this model this is margin that the Rival makes when he buys shares on the open market. 
Private benefit extraction causes deadweight loss. At the same time, a larger stake after 
takeover makes private benefits smaller and decreases takeover gain. Therefore the Rival 
always looks for a possibility to bid the lowest price to ensure success of the takeover; 
this also includes use of the toehold strategy as a source of additional gain. 
 
Effect of a Toehold Purchase 
 
The possibility to buy toeholds on the open market is very attractive for the Rival. He 
will have a higher profit than in the case of a fully dispersed ownership, since he 
increases his private benefits which are the only source of his profits, because of the free-
rider problem. The other parameter being equal, this price would be less then in Burkant, 
Gromb and Panunzi model, since the Rival extracts more private benefits when he buys 
shares on the open market. Hence, RtRd vbvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= −λφφ 2
1
*2
1
* 11 , since 
, where , as above, is the optimal bid in the case of a fully dispersed 
ownership, no defensive strategies available, no large shareholder, no toeholds; 
01⎯→⎯ →ββφ *db
Rt vb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= −λφ 2
1
* 1  - bid price in case of toehold. 
 
It is obvious from this analysis that the Rival will be willing to use the possibility to buy 
shares on the open market. At the same time, it harms the shareholders in the sense that 
they have a lower per-share value than they might had in the case of the Rider having no 
access to the open market. 
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Section 3.3: Joint effect of the parameters 
Now we assume that all new parameters are in the model. In this section the model 
internalizes the major, in the author’s opinion, regulatory parameters. The model will still 
be compared to the case of a fully dispersed ownership ( )0=α . In the case of a fully 
dispersed ownership the Rival aims at attracting exactly 
2
1  of all shares, the minimum 
amount required to obtain control. The post-takeover share value in the case of a fully 
dispersed ownership structure is equal to Rv⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − 2
1
1 φ  and this is also the bid that the Rival 
must offer to induce shareholders to tender half of their shares. 
 
All the cases here break down into two groups: the first group is where the minority 
blockholder is presented; the second group is where the majority blockholder is 
presented. 
 
In the presence of the possibility to use different defensive strategies, substantial private 
benefits and the possibility for the Rival to buy shares on the open market leads to the 
following equilibrium outcomes. 
 
 
I start the review of the effects from the first group – minority blockholder ( )%50<α : 
i) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ −λφ 2
1
1 , the blockholder has no impact on the outcome, but the 
possibility of implementation of defensive strategies and toeholds imply: 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of takeover, but 
lower than in the case of no allowance on purchasing shares on the open 
market; 
• A lower takeover possibility, but slightly higher than in absence of the open 
market purchase possibility. 
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ii) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> −− λφ 2
1
1 , the presence of a blockholder implies: 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of a takeover, 
but lower than in the case of no allowance on purchasing shares on the 
open market;; 
• A lower takeover probability, but slightly higher than in absence of the 
open market purchase possibility. 
 
For 0=α , no defensive strategies are available and no possibility to buy shares on the 
open market RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎪⎭
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1
1,1max* . This in turn should be 
greater or equal to the present share value of the bid to be successful: 
ISRR vvvv ≥≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − −λφφ 2
1
2
1
11 Hence, the possibility to buy shares on the open 
market decreases share value; implementation of defensive strategies, in turn, increases 
the price of shares and this leads to a slightly lower takeover probability. The Rival’s 
profit is less in this case than in a fully dispersed ownership. 
For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
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RR vv ⎟⎟⎠
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≥⎟⎟⎠
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − −++ λαα φφ 2
1
2
1
11  Compared to the case of a fully dispersed ownership this 
gives a higher bid price and higher β , but this price is less than in the case of no 
possibility to buy shares on the open market. It also is associated with lower profits for 
the Rival and this in turn implies lower probability of takeover. 
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From the assumptions that have been made above, it is clear that in both cases, 
RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ −λφ 2
1
1  and RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> −− λφ 2
1
1 , bid and share value are higher than in the basic 
model. Hence, one can conclude that the use of defensive strategies gives another chance 
for shareholders to bargain for better bid conditions, namely per-share value. At the same 
time it lowers the probability of takeover on one hand, but gives more strategic flexibility 
for the Rival on the other hand. 
 
Now let us look on the second group (majority blockholder %50≥α ): 
i) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤ 2
1
1 φ , the open market purchase possibility, implementation of 
defensive strategies and toeholds have no impact on the outcome and takeover is 
successful; 
ii) For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −> 2
1
1 φ , the presence of a majority blockholder implies 
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in the case of a takeover, 
the open market purchase possibility has no impact on the outcome, 
implementation of defensive strategies raises the value of the majority 
blockholder stake; 
• A lower takeover probability compared to all of the above cases. 
 
For 0=α , and no defensive strategies available 
RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
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For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
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1
1,1max*
αα φφ . Hence, one can see 
no impact on the post-takeover value. Besides this, the majority shareholder will tender 
his entire stake plus half of the atomistic shareholders will sell their shares. Compared to 
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the case of no blockholders this leads to a higher β . And this situation is very attractive 
for the Rival, since he got rid of the free-rider problem and gained control over the firm. 
For RB vv ⎟⎟⎠
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1
1 φ , RRBR vvvvb ⎟⎟⎠
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Compared to the case of fully dispersed ownership this gives a higher bid price and a 
higher β . But it is also associated with much lower profits for the Rival and this in turn 
implies a much lower probability (almost an impossibility) of takeover. 
 
In this situation we see almost the same picture as above. These factors lead to a higher 
share value and a higher stake acquired by the Rival, which in turn is very attractive for 
the Rival, since he gets rid of the free-rider problem, but on the other hand dramatically 
decreases takeover probability. Even the possibility to buy shares on the open market is 
not essential here, since it gives too little help to the Rival in gaining control over the 
firm. On the other hand, if the Rival has enough financial resources then this situation is 
very attractive to him. 
 
Conditional on the bid being successful, the blockholder has a higher willingness to 
tender than small shareholders. In fact, the blockholder tenders all his shares in any 
successful bid because he internalizes the appreciation of the untendered shares due to the 
increase in the Rival’s final stake. As small shareholders base their decision to tender on 
the post-takeover share value which itself depends on the fraction of shares tendered, the 
blockholder’s tendering decision affects their tendering decision as well. It is therefore 
impossible for the Rival to simply bypass the blockholder and to attract 50% of shares 
from small shareholders. To win control, the bidder must induce both the blockholder and 
(a fraction of) the small shareholders to tender. Because of the blockholder’s reluctance 
to tender, the Rival is forced to increase the price offered in order to be successful. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have developed an approach to model the impact of different legal 
parameters upon post-takeover outcomes. This paper shows that the presence of a 
defensive strategy leads to a higher bid price. This result is driven by the fact that 
defensive strategies are usually used as a back-up in bargaining for the better per-share 
price. Therefore the small shareholder’s supply of share increases with the bid price, 
which lessens the inefficient extraction of private benefits by the Rival. The same result 
is obtained in the case of the presence of a blockholder. At the same time the possibility 
to buy shares on the open market leads to a lower bid price and gives an extra incentive to 
the Rival, since, in equilibrium, the only source of the Rival’s profits is private benefits. 
And so the Rival increases his private benefits by acquiring shares on the open market. 
 
The joint effect is driven by the individual effects of the parameters. In other words the 
positive relationship implies that the small shareholders’ supply in the tender offer 
increases with the bid price but decreases with the number of shares tendered by the 
blockholder. It also means that the blockholder tenders his entire block in an equilibrium 
in which the bid succeeds. In this case, the bidder must offer a higher price either to win 
the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares from the small shareholders. But 
this is not the case in the presence of a majority blockholder, since then the Rival needs to 
offer the price that would satisfy the blockholder, and the role of minority shareholders 
does not become pivotal so their support is no longer needed. This benefits small 
shareholders, provided that the takeover is actually launched. Moreover, the presence of a 
blockholder, especially a majority blockholder, serves the role of a safeguard against 
value-decreasing bids. 
 
There are some desirable implications amongst the results of the model. The presence of 
a majority shareholder has the following effect: it increases the fraction of shares 
tendered in equilibrium. As well as reducing the bidder’s profit, a large shareholder acts 
as an anti-takeover device. That is why it is logical to expect the presence of a majority 
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shareholder and defensive strategies to be positively correlated. Majority blocks and 
takeover defenses both constitute an obstacle to hostile takeovers. 
 
The extension of the present analysis might be empirical research that focuses on the 
effects of the above-mentioned legal characteristics. The author would expect consistent 
results. And, of course, such research is needed to be done before any decision regarding 
regulation in the corporate governance system can be made. 
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Appendix 1 
 
9. A conditional offer is one that binds only if the raider gains control by having more 
than a specified percentage of the shares tendered 
 
13. These amendments raise the majority rule above 50% in the event of a hostile 
takeover. 
 
14. Staggered boards are a common defense designed to postpone the time at which the 
raider can gain full control of the board after a takeover. With only a fraction y of the 
board renewable every x years, the raider would have to wait up to x/2y years before 
gaining over 50% of the seats 
 
15. Ruling out two-tier tender offers - offers specify a higher price for the first n shares 
tendered than for the remaining ones. They tend to induce shareholders to tender and, 
hence, facilitate the takeover. Such offers are generally illegal in the U.S., but when they 
are not companies can ban them by writing an amendment into the corporate charter 
 
16. Most poison pills give the right to management to issue more voting shares at a low 
price to existing shareholders in the event that one shareholder owns more than a fraction 
x of outstanding shares. Such clauses, when enforced, make it virtually impossible for a 
takeover to succeed. When such a defense is in place the raider has to oust the incumbent 
board in a proxy fight and remove the pill. When the pill is combined with defenses that 
limit the raider’s ability to fight a proxy fight – for example a staggered board – the raider 
effectively has to bribe the incumbent board 
 
18. A golden parachute is a clause (or several) in an executive's employment contract 
specifying that they will receive certain large benefits if their employment is terminated. 
Sometimes it is only in the case that the company is acquired and the executive's 
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employment is terminated as a result, but not always. These benefits can be severance 
pay, cash bonuses, stock options or a combination of the items. 
 
19. Entrenchment is a possible description of the actions of managers of firms. Managers 
can make investments that are more valuable under themselves than under alternative 
managers. Those investments might not maximize shareholder value. So shareholders 
have a moral hazard in contracting with managers. 
 
20. It is an event that may occur when opposition develops to a corporation management 
among its stockholders. Corporate activists may attempt to persuade shareholders to use 
their proxy votes (i.e. votes by one individual or institution as the authorized 
representative of another) to install new management for any of a variety of reasons. 
